Hi Balkan, Great analysis! From my point of view, everything you say makes sense. Question: is that the right point of view? Are either of us able to get inside Putin‘s head? What is the probability that his cost-benefit calculus is significantly different than what we Westerners think?
No we cannot get into his head…and I do not think Putin made up his mind completely. I think he still hopes to achieve his goals without risking war and without the need to occupy/control more territory. Cost-benefit analysis would depend on how much value he attaches to achieving his primary goals, i.e. what is the expected value given the risk he is willing to take and probability of success. The higher he values those goals the lower the probability of success he needs. Issue salience is also different between RU and the West and taking prospect theory seriously, it’s clear to me that Putin sees the situation as being in the domain of losses rather than gains, making him more risk acceptant. There is also the possibility that is playing a different game (as in game theory) than we assume. We think we are playing Chicken, where the Conflict is worst outcome in terms of preference order while he might have constructed the situation where his preference order could be such that Conflict is not the worst option, thus willing to go to conflict rather than compromise.
This is great analysis. I am mainly skeptical about the idea that Putin's escalation has committed him to taking action unless he gets concessions. It seems to me that the cost to Putin of taking an off ramp and probing for future opportunities is not necessarily that high. I think Putin still has a range of options; he hasn't really burned his boats.
Thanks Robert! It is possible that I am overestimating the cost of backing down for Putin without significant concessions. I think it would largely depend on the off ramp offered…arms control talks that could take years probably wouldn’t cut it but perhaps there are some innovative mechanisms/diplomatic offers that I am not thinking (e.g. calling it quarantine rather than blockade or just going ahead with invasion/airstrikes in Cuban missile crisis). I’ll do a premortem on my analysis shortly.
@Balkan, it is always a genuine intellectual delight to peruse your in-depth analyses. I particularly subscribe with one of the scenarios that your writing presents: most likely, it seems to me, that all sudden, unexpected moves will occur by means of the separatist troops, while the ''official army'' is training in the yard across the wall (not sure if there is a functional border though). In any case I hope that this will be a short attack that would not spread into a wider conflict.
What I cannot get past is why Putin is engaging in this behavior. I understand that he would like to rebuild the Soviet Empire. I also understand that he wishes to keep NATO at a distance. But military action in Ukraine that stops short of complete occupation achieves neither objective. In fact, the likely sanctions imposed on Russia will cripple the economy and undermine its ability to sell its resources on the world market, not to mention making Putin and his oligarchs' personal wealth nearly impossible to move. That leads me to consider that Putin's motivations are more political than anything else. The US-centric explanation is that Putin is trying to embarrass Biden and his diplomacy-first approach to world politics ahead of the 2022 midterm elections. However, such an issue is just as likely to act as a wedge within the current Republican Party power structure, exposing fully the pro- and anti-Trump elements. More to the point, I think it is ridiculous to believe that Putin would exhaust so many of his power chips to affect a non-presidential US election. My thought is that Putin's strategy is to employ a minor invasion to undermine Ukraine as a secondary consideration, but to enable an "anti-terrorism" crackdown within Russia as the primary motivator. Russia's invasion of Chechnya and subsequent years of blood-letting enabled an internal crackdown on "terrorism" in Russia (think: apartment bombings, Beslan massacre, Moscow theater incident) that help Putin secure and then retain the Russian Presidency. As a pretext, it is plausible that an invasion of Ukraine might lead to Ukrainian "terrorist acts" within Russia, justifying an internal crackdown in Russia again even if the entire situation is fabricated. Which leads me to wonder -- since I am not current by any stretch of the imagination in the internal workings of Russia -- why Putin might fear an insurgency such to risk the repercussions of an invasion of Ukraine?
Hi Balkan, Great analysis! From my point of view, everything you say makes sense. Question: is that the right point of view? Are either of us able to get inside Putin‘s head? What is the probability that his cost-benefit calculus is significantly different than what we Westerners think?
No we cannot get into his head…and I do not think Putin made up his mind completely. I think he still hopes to achieve his goals without risking war and without the need to occupy/control more territory. Cost-benefit analysis would depend on how much value he attaches to achieving his primary goals, i.e. what is the expected value given the risk he is willing to take and probability of success. The higher he values those goals the lower the probability of success he needs. Issue salience is also different between RU and the West and taking prospect theory seriously, it’s clear to me that Putin sees the situation as being in the domain of losses rather than gains, making him more risk acceptant. There is also the possibility that is playing a different game (as in game theory) than we assume. We think we are playing Chicken, where the Conflict is worst outcome in terms of preference order while he might have constructed the situation where his preference order could be such that Conflict is not the worst option, thus willing to go to conflict rather than compromise.
This is great analysis. I am mainly skeptical about the idea that Putin's escalation has committed him to taking action unless he gets concessions. It seems to me that the cost to Putin of taking an off ramp and probing for future opportunities is not necessarily that high. I think Putin still has a range of options; he hasn't really burned his boats.
Thanks Robert! It is possible that I am overestimating the cost of backing down for Putin without significant concessions. I think it would largely depend on the off ramp offered…arms control talks that could take years probably wouldn’t cut it but perhaps there are some innovative mechanisms/diplomatic offers that I am not thinking (e.g. calling it quarantine rather than blockade or just going ahead with invasion/airstrikes in Cuban missile crisis). I’ll do a premortem on my analysis shortly.
@Balkan, it is always a genuine intellectual delight to peruse your in-depth analyses. I particularly subscribe with one of the scenarios that your writing presents: most likely, it seems to me, that all sudden, unexpected moves will occur by means of the separatist troops, while the ''official army'' is training in the yard across the wall (not sure if there is a functional border though). In any case I hope that this will be a short attack that would not spread into a wider conflict.
Thanks Rosen!
Perhaps unsurprisingly, about 50% of new Russian citizens in 2021 were citizens of Ukraine. https://t.me/sputniklive/29818
What I cannot get past is why Putin is engaging in this behavior. I understand that he would like to rebuild the Soviet Empire. I also understand that he wishes to keep NATO at a distance. But military action in Ukraine that stops short of complete occupation achieves neither objective. In fact, the likely sanctions imposed on Russia will cripple the economy and undermine its ability to sell its resources on the world market, not to mention making Putin and his oligarchs' personal wealth nearly impossible to move. That leads me to consider that Putin's motivations are more political than anything else. The US-centric explanation is that Putin is trying to embarrass Biden and his diplomacy-first approach to world politics ahead of the 2022 midterm elections. However, such an issue is just as likely to act as a wedge within the current Republican Party power structure, exposing fully the pro- and anti-Trump elements. More to the point, I think it is ridiculous to believe that Putin would exhaust so many of his power chips to affect a non-presidential US election. My thought is that Putin's strategy is to employ a minor invasion to undermine Ukraine as a secondary consideration, but to enable an "anti-terrorism" crackdown within Russia as the primary motivator. Russia's invasion of Chechnya and subsequent years of blood-letting enabled an internal crackdown on "terrorism" in Russia (think: apartment bombings, Beslan massacre, Moscow theater incident) that help Putin secure and then retain the Russian Presidency. As a pretext, it is plausible that an invasion of Ukraine might lead to Ukrainian "terrorist acts" within Russia, justifying an internal crackdown in Russia again even if the entire situation is fabricated. Which leads me to wonder -- since I am not current by any stretch of the imagination in the internal workings of Russia -- why Putin might fear an insurgency such to risk the repercussions of an invasion of Ukraine?