TL;DR:
I believe exile is the most likely outcome (70-75%) followed by toppling of the regime and trial for Lukashenko (10-15%).
The remaining options (suppression and riding out) are hard to distinguish from each other at this stage but they remain unlikely.
There is an important caveat however. If we do not see a clear indication for one or the other of the first two options in the next 2 to 4 weeks, I’d have to revise my estimates and increase the probability of the “riding out” scenario significantly.
See pre-mortem for why I could be wrong.
What will it be , Sasha? Lukashescu, Lukanovych, Lukassad, or Lukaduro?
I was going to write about Aristotle and the craft of noise reduction in this issue but developments in Belarus, particularly the incident below made me delay the Aristotle post. That post is still in the works so no worries…
We also have this piece by Dmitri Trenin, which I think accurately reflects the considerations within the Russian elite:
And also there is this thread by Mark Galeotti (who knows a thing or two about FSU):
I think together these are quite strong signals (4/5 or even 4.5) that this is the beginning of the end for Lukashenko.
I do not know much about domestic politics or the internal dynamics of Belarus. So I do not have much of an inside view, which makes it easier to adopt the outside view in this instance. What are the options for authoritarian leaders at this stage of the game (i.e. being booed at your own rally and your sole backer is having doubts about your survival)? There are broadly four possibilities; end up like Yanukovych, Ceausescu, Assad, or Maduro.
Exile. He either flees like Yanukovych in 2014 or a deal is made (with the help of Kremlin no doubt) that ensures a managed transition as Lukashenko and his family go to exile (maybe to a dacha in the occupied Crimea perhaps?). This is the Yanukovych option.
Trial. Security forces switch sides and Lukashenko is toppled and captured before he can flee. Depending on the circumstances of his arrest/capture and the internal dynamics of the security apparatus (after all there would be many who would be concerned about revelations in a court of law and rather have Lukashenko silenced forever) this can end either in a Ceausescu scenario or a Mubarak scenario. This is the Ceausescu option.
Suppression. Lukashenko secures the loyalty of the majority of Belarussian security forces and with the help of “little green men” from Russia cracks down on the protestors violently, confident that the West would only issue condemnations but would not intervene. Depending on how coherent/cohesive security apparatus remains during this assault on protestors it could mean significant civilian casualties or perhaps even a quasi-civil war if sufficient number of security personnel defects (assuming no Western military assistance to opposition if things got to this stage). This is the Assad option.
Riding it out. Using delaying tactics and vague promises of reform Lukashenko tries to ride this out, banking on no meaningful Western action (either against his regime or in support of the opposition) and trying to co-opt some parts of the opposition. Regime’s core remains united and the protests fizzle out as they lose momentum, leaving Lukashenko weakened but in power. This is the Maduro option.
Which scenario will prevail will depend on several factors including how long the opposition can sustain the momentum, whether security forces will defect, whether there are secret negotiations going on for a managed transition, and of course what would Russia do. Like I said I do not know much about internal dynamics in Belarus but I think we can have an indirect indication of those dynamics by looking at what Russia is likely to do. Surely Kremlin could estimate the correlation of forces in Belarus better than anyone else so looking at Putin’s likely actions should give us clues about those internal dynamics.
Here I’ll cheat and direct you to two recents pieces; one by Mark Galeotti and the other by Dmitri Trenin. Go ahead read them. TL;DR? Kremlin is unlikely to intervene militarily to save Lukashenko and most likely position itself as the powerbroker in a managed transition. Sasha seems to be out of luck. Here Dmitri Trenin again summarizing options for Russia:
So where does this leaves us about the fate of Lukashenko? Will he end up as Lukanovych, Lukashescu, Lukassad, or Lukaduro (perhaps stretching the analogy/pun a bit too much here)?
I believe exile is the most likely outcome (70-75%) followed by toppling of the regime and trial for Lukashenko (10-15%). The remaining options (suppression and riding out) are hard to distinguish from each other at this stage but they remain unlikely. There is an important caveat however. If we do not see a clear indication for one or the other of the first two options in the next 2 to 4 weeks, I’d have to revise my estimates and increase the probability of the “riding out” scenario significantly.
Pre-Mortem
Why I could be wrong?
I have underestimated Lukashenko’s will to stay in power at any cost, including risking civil war.
I have overestimated the coherence and stamina of the opposition protests and they end up fizzling out.
I underestimated the loyalty of the security forces to Lukashenko’s regime and their willingness to use deadly force against the protestors.
I relied too much on what Putin is likely to do as a proxy to understand the internal correlation of forces in Belarus and therefore missed some important domestic dynamic.
I overestimated the probability that Kremlin will act as the powerbroker and prefer the managed transition option over others.
I underestimated the psychological impact of Lukashenko’s removal from office - as a fellow authoritarian leader - in a “color revolution” (shall we call it a red-white revolution?) on Putin and thus underestimate his willingness to keep him in power lest they come for him next. Putin’s personal view of Lukashenko is besides the point here (and by all accounts Putin does not like him personally at all).
As usual please let me know what you think and why I might be wrong in the comments below and share it with others.
Would you say that in the case of Lukashenko falling the next leader will be determined by the Kremlin without Western input? That would seem to me the most plausible scenario in that case because the Kremlin wouldn't want another NATO friendly country as you said.